In Taiwan, marriage practices were as variegated as in the southeastern part of Mainland China. Thanks to Taiwan's excellent administration of its early twentieth century population, the variation of marriage forms has been charted and analyzed in great detail. 11 The
Taiwanese have married in the major, the minor as well as the uxorilocal variant. In the Northern part of the island, minor marriage was highly popular, in fact in some localities it was the most common type. On the other hand, in the southern and western parts of Taiwan, major marriage was the dominant form. Everywhere, uxorilocal marriages formed a minority, but in some (western) localities it occurred surprisingly frequent. 12 From about the 1920s onwards, the popularity of major marriage surged at the expense of the other types.
Increasingly, women originally adopted as sim-pua or "little daughters-in-law" would not marry their foster brother but instead marry and move out of the family. 13 Very gradually, the practice of arranged marriage began to corrode as well. 14 As to timing and frequency of marriage the rural Taiwanese population had the same characteristics as found in Mainland China: early and universal marriage for women and a lower incidence and a later timing for men. Also, a low social status tended to delay male marriage. 15 Interestingly, recent findings from Taipei city suggest that urban Taiwanese women married later and stayed more often single than rural women. Wolf and Gates claim that the high rates of female celibacy in Taipei do not stem from "urban freedom" engendered by employment opportunities, but on the contrary indicate the persisting parental authority over women. Their wage income simply made it more expedient to keep them longer at home.
Evidence for this interpretation is seen in the fact that in particular Taipei women without older brothers tended to remain single. 16 In this article we will use a large database with complete household histories of nine Taiwanese communities to explore variation in marriage forms in the early twentieth century.
By combining information on Taiwanese individuals, their households and the communities in which they lived we hope to put to a statistical test a number of hypotheses regarding the choice of the marriage type. As individual destinies choices were highly subjected to the interest of the family at large, we can only unravel marriage decisions when we depart from the point of view of the parental generation. Actually, decisions about adoption of infant girls were often taken by the grandparents of the child that was adopted in or out. 17 The purpose of our article is to understand decisions regarding timing and type of marriage, in terms of the motivations of the (grand)parents of husband and wife. The Taiwanese dataset is ideally suited for this purpose, as will be discussed later. The parental concerns regarding the marital choices of their children were: cutting down the costs of marriage, procuring additional labor for the household, ensuring that spouses for the children would be available, acquiring prestige and status, ensuring their authority and forging family alliances. In the next section, we will discuss these concerns and motives. Then, we will discuss how we proceed from this ethnographic evidence to the construction of statistical models. In the subsequent sections we describe the variation in marital forms in our field sites in more detail and we put our hypotheses to the test in three "competing risks" models.
Parental concerns

Costs of marriage
In Taiwan, marriage was a costly affair, at least the "major" fashion was. Apart from the costs of the go-between and the wedding feast itself, a girl had to be given a dowry. Although the parents received a bride price to compensate them for the costs or raising the girl, the dowry had to match or even surpass the bride price. Besides the prestige that the public display of a lavish dowry brought, a considerable dowry was considered a precondition for the good treatment of the girl in her new household. 18 The groom's family had to raise the bride price.
It has been estimated that small farmers, in other words the average Taiwanese family, would have to save ten to fifteen years to finance a major marriage, money they'd much rather spend on expanding their farm. For wage workers, the bride wealth amounted to about 240 daily wages. 19 The price for a sim-pua was related to her age but amounted to only a fraction of the price for an adult daughter-in-law. In all, the costs of minor marriage were about one-tenth of the costs of major marriage. 20 Thus, getting a sim-pua for their son was very attractive to the poor. In 1896, the Canadian missionary MacKay noted: "This is much cheaper, as she earns more than she costs, and no gifts or money need to be paid her parents at the marriage." 21 However, Wolf and Huang 22 have argued that minor marriage in Taiwan was not a strategy for the poor, as it seems to have been the case in the Mainland. 23 They noticed that there was little social differentiation in the tendency to marry in this fashion. In fact, it was common among rural elites. Also, the practice was found frequently among (urban) middle classes, even more than among the urban poor. 24 Uxorilocal marriages, on the other hand, were unequivocally associated with poverty. For poor families, this option brought material benefits that compensated the low prestige of this marriage type. The groom did not have to provide bride wealth whereas his parents did not have to provide him with a workable inheritance. Thus, men with many brothers married more often in this fashion. Also, men living alone, orphans and widowers resorted frequently to this type of marriage, clearly because they could not afford a proper (second) wedding. 25 
Additional labor
Taiwanese households generally provided their own labor. Taiwanese women did all kinds of household chores, whereas the women of the Hakka minority worked in the fields as well.
They could do so, because their feet were not bound. Families that needed additional women could adopt servant girls (ca-bo-kan). Also, they might have preferred to have a sim-pua work for them rather than to exploit their own daughter. However, this does not seem to have been an important motive for choosing the minor marriage type. An indication for this is the fact that the feet of the sim-puas were bound just as often as the feet of other girls, so they were not adopted for their capacity to work in the fields. 26 The labor motive is more important in uxorilocal marriage. Families that called-in a husband did so because there were no surviving sons or because the sons were still too young to work on the land. Mostly, the husband would work for his father-in-law for a stipulated period and he would give at least one of his sons the surname of his wife. 27 After this period, for instance when the youngest was old enough, he would leave with his wife and his "own" children. Calling-in a husband was much less expensive than hiring laborers. In specific areas where the ecological circumstances created a strong demand for additional field labor, uxorilocal marriage occurred very frequent. The irrigations systems constructed by the Japanese appear to have diminished the demand for labor and to have caused a strong decline in uxorilocal marriages in the 1930s. 28 
Availability of spouses
A well-known problem in Chinese demography is the shortage of women. The major cause for this was female infanticide. In Taiwan during the Japanese occupation, however, female infanticide was almost absent, at least it did not affect the sex ratios at birth. 29 Notwithstanding this, a male surplus did exist, in particular in Northern Taiwan, due to the sex-specific labor migration to this tea-exporting region. In addition, mortality rates among women were higher than among men. According to Wolf and Huang 30 , the resulting pressure on the marriage market triggered a mechanism on the parallel market of adoptions.
Increasingly, the match makers would seek out families with infant girls, persuading them to give them away. They would expand their activities to adjacent markets as well. In the whole region, the age of adoption went down. In particular girls who were born after the birth of a son were likely to be adopted-out. However, infant mortality among the uprooted and bewildered sim-puas was high and aggravated the shortage of girls even more. Finding and acquiring a sim-pua did involve costs. Because the middle classes were more successful in acquiring "little daughters-in-law", lower-class families were increasingly left with no other option but a very meagre wedding in the major fashion. In turn, this lowered the social standing of major marriages as such and propelled the demand for minor marriage. 31 Thus, the popularity of minor marriage in Northern Taiwan was not associated with poverty, but with wealth, commercialisation and economic expansion. 32 Similar market mechanisms are not relevant in the case of uxorilocal marriages. The demand for men was not very strong and there was simply no shortage of poor men to meet it. 33 
Prestige
Chinese villages studies testify to the need of "keeping face". Being a respected family was vital in all dealings and transactions needed for improving the family's standard of living. 34 Ideally, children were married in the major fashion, expensive dowries were displayed and a big wedding party was hosted. However, as we have seen, people could and did forsake this ideal for less prestigious forms of marriages when the need arose. This holds particularly true for uxorilocal marriages. Here, there were no public festivities. The ceremony would be very subdued, if held at all. Some Taiwanese informants even claimed that the husband would simply walk alone to his bride's home after dark, so as not to be seen. 35 In his new household, he was subjected to his wife's father and other male relatives, much like a servant. Inmarrying men were widely referred to as "parasitical husbands". The marriages were deemed unstable, because men married in this way often resented their subjugated position and broke up the marriage.
Parental authority
As Wolf and Huang (1980) have pointed out succinctly: the choice between minor and major marriage was often one between "peace at home" and "allies abroad". Indeed, the tensions created by the hierarchy (based on generation, age and gender) within Chinese extended families were formidable. 36 In particular the position of the daughter-in-law was problematic, at least until she had produced male offspring. 37 The parents-in-law feared that she would plot with their son to split the household. The forces that threatened the domestic harmony were known as "pillow ghosts". One way for the parents to minimize the threat of these ghosts was to socialize and discipline a daughter-in-law themselves. As one elderly informant put it: "The advantage of raising a sim-pua is that while she is not dear to her husband, she is of one mind with her mother-in-law. A girl from another family is usually dear to her husband, but almost never of one mind with her mother-in-law". 38 Minor marriage suited the overall patriarchal power structure of Chinese families. In southern Taiwan, where the Han had mixed with the more egalitarian Aborigines, minor marriages were less popular than elsewhere. 39 
Family alliances
For emphasizing friendship between clans (surname groups), major marriage was the most suitable marriage type. The links created by minor marriage were much weaker. Studies of Taiwanese elite families demonstrate the importance of exchanging brides. 40 Because Taiwan was colonized by Han Chinese in successive waves from different mainland areas, there is a regional variation in the strength of kin groups. In some areas, violent conflict between clans and villages was still rampant around 1900. According to Pasternak, this may be the cause of a stronger preference for major marriage in some (southern Taiwanese) areas where clans needed to strengthen their position by forging strategic alliances. 41 Thus, we can expect less minor marriages (see above) and more major marriages in our field sites in southern Taiwan.
Modeling marital decisions
In making decisions as to when and how their sons and daughters should marry, Chinese parents had to juggle many pros and contras in their minds. They had to consider their material options, the benefits of a loyal adopted daughter-in-law versus the cost and dangers of having to raise her, the situation in the marriage and adoption markets and their need for "face" in the community and for allied families. Clearly, one can never reconstruct completely these complex choices of Chinese families in the past. However, in the case of Taiwan, we can make an effort at disentangling marriage decisions.
First of all, the Taiwanese administration of households belongs to the most accurate historical micro-level sources in the world. Although the pao-chia system of organization on the basis of households goes back to the 18 th century, it was largely inefficient until the Japanese colonial government revived and provided the system with administrative tasks. 42 The household registers cover the period 1905-1945. The registers record meticulously the statuses (sex, position in the sibling order, relation to the head of the household etcetera), as well a demographic changes, such as adoption, marriage, child birth, and death. Second, the household registers of a number of entire Taiwanese communities have been computerized by the Institute of Ethnology of Academia Sinica. With multivariate statistical models we can perform an elaborate test of at least some of the assumptions and hypotheses that are discussed above. In this section, we will discuss the building of these models.
As will be clear by now, marriage in Taiwan was strongly "path dependent", that is determined by decisions made many years earlier. A girl adopted out at infancy was likely to be married in the minor fashion, unless she and her prospective husband could not get along at all and her foster parents sent her back or adopted her out themselves. Conversely, if parents had not adopted a sim-pua for their son many years before, he could not marry in the minor fashion. Thus, in our view, marriage decision-making in Taiwan involves a series of choices. The first choice is to adopt a girl in or out. For girls that had been adopted, there was still an option not to marry in the minor fashion, but clearly her options were different than for girls still living at home at adolescence, who could only marry in the major or in the uxorilocal fashion. Sons living at home at adolescence may marry in the major, the uxorilocal or the minor fashion, the latter on the condition that a simpua has been adopted. When there was no adopted girl present, they could only marry in the major or uxorilocal way. A related choice involves the timing of marriage. Since major marriage is desirable but expensive, most families will have to save money to afford it. Poor families will need more time for saving, whereas economic pressure will lengthen the waiting time for all families. For some families, the material burden proves too high causing them to choose the least desirable form of uxorilocal marriage.
Because the risks of marrying in a specific form are so unevenly spread, we will make separate models depending on the type of residence (or adoption status) at early adolescence (age fifteen). Our first model selects sons living in households with at least one adopted girl present. The second model selects household without potential brides present. The third model includes girls that still live with their parents at age fifteen. Our final model analyses the fate of girls that have been adopted-in (this will be addressed in a separate paper). In our models we will integrate the different factors that influence timing and type of marriage. In particular, we will look at the impact of economic pressure, socio-economic status, household composition, and sex ratio. In addition, we will consider the effects of ethnicity, region, type of community, and period.
During the Japanese occupation, living standards in Taiwan were low. However, there are indications that, although the Japanese efforts were clearly directed at the exploitation of Taiwan's natural resources, some benefits did accrue to the population. From the mid-1920s onwards, mortality declined markedly, due to improvements in public health and increased medicalization. 43 Though Taiwan's production rose strongly, it is not clear to what extent consumption per capita rose as well. 44 However, recent anthropometrical research suggests that birth cohorts from the 1920s onwards benefited from improved diets. The average length of successive cohorts increased, whereas this trend was much less conspicuous in Mainland
China. 45 We expect that strong rises in the food prices will have caused families to delay an intended wedding, whereas a prolonged crisis will have increased the likelihood of an uxorilocal marriage. The pressure of high prices was particularly strong in 1912, [1918] [1919] [1925] [1926] and during the Second World War. 46 As we have outlined above, uxorilocal marriage seems to have been an option primarily for poor households, particularly those that provided the husbands. Little social differentiation is Agricultural class includes fisherman and a wide spectrum of farmers, including poor tenant farmers, rich peasants, and landlords. Ideally, we would like to link occupational information to data in the land registers in order to assess the wealth of farming families.
Household composition is related in many ways to marriage choices. As we have discussed in the previous section, girls without (older) brothers were more likely to be married uxorilocal, which often implied a later age at marriage. Even when brothers were present, a (relative)
shortage of male labor may have increased the demand for in-marrying husbands. We have created binary variables that indicate whether one has siblings at all, whether one had no brothers and whether one had only younger brothers. The effect of male labor is captured in a variable that gives the ratio of men aged 15-65 to all household members. In addition, we look at the effect of the size of the household. Furthermore, we expect that the presence of both parents was important in ensuring the "best" marital option for their children. Widows and widowers were probably less capable of saving for the wedding and negotiating dowry and bride price for their children. In addition, extended families probably had more resources to arrange a timely and "proper" wedding of its members. Thus, we expect adolescents living in extended households to marry relatively early and infrequent in the uxorilocal fashion.
The effect of skewed sex ratios on the marriage market was, according to Wolf and Huang in their Marriage and Adoption in China, vital in explaining the surge of minor marriages in Northern Taiwan. Ideally, to estimate the pressure on regional marriage markets, one would like to include the sex ratio of unmarried men and women aged 15-24 in the area surrounding the communities. However, the Japanese censuses that yield this kind of detailed information
were not available to us. Therefore, we have calculated the sex ratio of the unmarried men and women based on the study areas where their data was entered. We expect that in communities with a strong male surplus, the tendency for minor marriage will be strong.
Ethnicity has a potential bearing on marriage as well. In the early 20 th century, the descendants of migrants from different areas in China were known as Hokkien and Hakka. 49 In our analysis, we can test whether this finding is corroborated in a multivariate analysis.
Regional and local differentiation in marriage forms cannot be explained solely from variation in economic or demographic factors. For instance, where descent groups were less strong, as in the south, there was more need for major marriage in order to form interfamily alliances.
Thus, we add a variable indicating the region of the communities. In addition, towns can have different patterns than rural areas. Expanding female employment opportunities in towns may induce the parents to delay the marriage of their daughters. Also, there will be less need for temporary labor than in rural communities, which will lead to a lower incidence of uxorilocal marriage. On the other hand, in places with a large population size, it may be easier to find a suitable partner which may lower the age at marriage. In particular we expect this to be the case in places that are not isolated (indicated by population turnover). Finally, we add to the models a period effect that will indicate trends in the age at marriage during the period studied.
Variation in marriage types
In this paper we analyse the household registers of nine communities. Seven field sites are located in the northern and western parts of the island. Most of the communities can be characterized as rural, whereas three of them are towns: Lu-kang and Ta-chia in the west and Tung-kang in the south. Obviously, in the rural communities the occupational structure was characterized by agriculture. In the town, a sizeable proportion of people worked in commerce or in industry, the latter in particular in Ta-chia. This town was already famous for its woven sleeping mats, but in 1897 the weavers developed the Ta-chia Panama hat, which was a successful export product. Also, after the completion of the railroad (1922) the town became a convenient place to distribute goods and services to the surroundings areas. In some northwestern field sites, yearly population turnover amounted to one-fifth of the population.
Interestingly, the towns of Lu-kang and Tung-kang had low rates of mobility. In almost all field sites we find high sex ratios, in particular in the beginning of our period.
How were the types of marriage distributed across regions, social groups, types or residence etcetera? We selected men and women born between 1880 and 1920 who came under observation on and before age 15 for our analysis. For a first impression, the distribution of the types of marriage of men suffices (Table 1) . Apart from marriage types, we indicate the percentage of men "censored", meaning they either died, emigrated from the community or were lost to observation before they married or they were still unmarried at age 30. The table confirms, in broad terms, the evidence from earlier studies as discussed in the introduction.
Major marriage became more popular in the younger cohort: 61,9% of the men born in the period 1906-1920 married in the major fashion, versus only 49,8% of the men born between 1880 and 1905. Marrying a sim-pua was much more popular in the North (17,5%) than it was in the South (1,7%). It was also more popular in rural areas (17,5%) than in towns (9,1%) areas. Contrary to findings in other studies, Hakka were more prone than Hokkien to marry in the minor fashion (22,1% versus 13,3%). Although minor marriage is frequent among
Mainland Hakka as well, strong ethnic intergroup differences have not been reported for Taiwan. 50 As we expected, parents would try to avoid an ignoble wedding in the case of their first-born son. Sons with no or only younger brothers married twice as often uxorilocal as sons with older brothers. Sons who were an only child, however, married often in this fashion.
Possibly these sons were orphans unable to form their own family. Only and first-born sons married also more often in the minor fashion, indicating that parents -anxious to continue the patrilineage -tried to arrange the marriage of their eldest boy as soon as possible. Marrying in the major fashion required the largest expenses, and apparently, was more feasible when both parents were present and able to direct household funds to the marriage. These funds could be most easily amassed in an extended family household: 61,5% of sons living in such a household married in the major fashion versus 53,6% in a nuclear and 53,4% in a stem family household. Conversely, men living in a broken family were more than five times as likely to marry uxorilocal than men living in an extended family. The distribution of marriages types of women still living with their parents at age 15 reflects table 1. However, the differences between ethnic group were not as outspoken. Also, first-born girls were not more liable than later-born ones to marry in the major fashion. Girls from upper-class families, extended households and households in which they lived with both parents married relatively often in the major type, presumably because their families did not need the labour of a living-in sonin-law. To measure this more directly, we have calculated the relative presence of male workers in the households. Men marrying uxorilocal did come from households with a relative abundance of male adult workers (34%), whereas households that called-in husband had a much lower proportion of male workers (21%). Interestingly, the households that sent as well as those that received uxorilocal husbands were of relatively small size.
[ Table 1 about here]
Marriage types as competing risks
Descriptive statistics are very helpful in building hypotheses for the explanation of marriage variation. However, the aggregate statistics we just discuss may hide many compositional effects. For instance, household structure and social status may be closely related. Is social status still important regardless of the household structure? Thus, to find the most relevant factors one needs to control for many variables as well as determine the statistical significance level. For this purpose, multivariate techniques are inevitable.
Marriage in Taiwan meant that the parents had to decide both the timing and the type of the wedding. They might avoid risks and arrange an early wedding for their son with a sim-pua.
Or they might invest in their reputation and save for a major marriage. Finally, parents down on their luck might have to choose for uxorilocal marriage or even celibacy for their son. For daughters, the decisions were even more drastic. Either they were adopted out at infancy, or kept at home to be married in the minor or the uxorilocal fashion. Only in the latter case could they remain in familiar surroundings. 
Men in households with adopted sisters
Our first model (Table 2) [ Table 2 about here]
The competing risk analysis of proportional hazards allows us to draw two types of conclusions. On the one hand, when the effect of a particular variable is the same across the three forms of marriage, we can conclude that timing and incidence of marriage as such is affected. When marriage was universal, as was the case with women, the coefficients pertain unequivocally to timing, thus age at marriage. 53 On the other hand, when the effects are different between the types of marriage we know that the choice between types of marriage is influenced. Indeed, many factors affected marriage as such, regardless of the type. Sons in younger birth cohorts married earlier and more frequent: the hazard ratios are significant and higher than 1.00 in all forms of marriage. Also, it becomes apparent that men belonging to the Hakka minority married later and perhaps remained celibate more often than others. Sex ratios affected timing and incidence in all types of marriage: the higher the male surplus, the lower the age at marriage and (presumably) the higher its incidence tended to be. Clearly, our model is not designed to indicate a relationship between a male surplus and the strategy of adopting sim-puas -a strategy that only much later would result in minor marriages.
Economic pressure tended to delay marriage. When the food price went up, the age at marriage went up as well. Clearly, the Chinese cultural preference for early and universal marriage did not preclude a cautious response to adverse times. 54 Contrary to what we expected, marriage was relatively late in communities with a large population size. On the other hand, high rates of turnover -that we interpret as a low level of isolation -were associated with earlier marriage in major and minor fashions.
A number of variables are significant for only one or two of the marriage types, indicating choice between types. As we expected, minor marriage was most popular in Northern Taiwan.
Also, it was a highly unlikely choice when no parents were present in the household. Major marriage was preferred in towns, even in households with at least one sim-pua. Also, it was significantly more likely in elite and business (compared to farmers) and less likely in the households of labourers. Both major and minor marriage benefited from the sheer size of the household. However, the relative presence of male workers in the family had the opposite effects. The more men of working age present in the household, the later the age at marriage would be (significant for major and minor marriage). Clearly, an "abundance" of labor did not encourage the parents to divert funds for an early marriage. Perhaps they were less worried about additional labour or continuation of the patriline and tended to delay the marriage of their sons, at least until they could spare them a lavish wedding. Finally, although uxorilocal marriage was a rare choice in the households with sim-puas present, we do find an interesting effect. It was a highly unlikely option for sons who had only younger brothers. This also suggests that sim-puas tended to be designated for the first born son.
Men in households without adopted sisters
Most of the men in our sample (68,4 per cent) lived in household without adopted little daughters-in-law. Consequently, they could only marry in the major or the uxorilocal type.
We have observed 3051 marriages of this selected group, of which 87,3 per cent were major and 12,7 per cent were uxorilocal. Table 3 allows us to understand both the timing of marriage and the choice of type of marriage. A number of outcomes parallel those in table 2.
Again, we find that men in younger cohorts married earlier, that early (major) marriage was stimulated by high sex ratios, that high food prices had a depressing effect on marriage, and that population size and Hakka identity were associated with lower hazards of marriage. In towns, major marriage occurred more often and earlier than in villages. Labourers were more likely than farmers to marry uxorilocal, and less likely to marry in the major fashion. The choice for an uxorilocal marriage was more likely when the parents of the man were absent and also in stem family households. Perhaps it was for grandparents "easier" to make this kind of drastic decision involving a family member? Leaving home to live in another household was less likely when the man was an only child, had no brothers or had only younger brothers. This means, of course that younger sons were the most likely candidates to be sent away for uxorilocal marriage. Major marriage, on the other hand, was less related to sibling position. An only son was more likely to marry in this way than sons with (older)
brothers. Again, we see that relatively many male workers in the household lowered the age and likelihood of major marriage, whereas the size of the household worked in the opposite direction.
[ Table 3 about here]
Daughters still living in their parental household
Daughters who were not adopted out at infancy left home and married in the major fashion (86%, N=3589 observed marriages) or stayed at home and married in the uxorilocal fashion (14%). The competing risk model for the daughters (Table 4 ) forms in some respects the complementary of the model for sons. In particular, this holds true for the hazards of uxorilocal marriage. Daughters who were the only child, those who had no brothers and those who had only younger brothers had relatively high chances of marrying a living-in husband.
Interestingly, when in the case of sons the uxorilocal option was more likely when his parents were absent, in the case of girls it became less likely without her parents, even after factors such as sibling position and social class were controlled. Parents heading nuclear families tended to choose this option more often for their daughters than parents in other household types. Contrary to our expectations, a shortage of male labour did not (significantly) increase the likelihood of calling-in a husband. However, the larger the household, the less likely this became. This fits in with our findings on the effects of parental absence, sibling composition and the nuclear family. Men were "summoned" to small families, not necessarily because of their labour capacity. 55 The other outcomes of Table 4 reflect the results in the son's models. Overall, early marriage was more likely in the younger cohorts, in the Northern part of Taiwan, in periods with favourable food prices, in relatively small communities and in communities with a high turnover. Early (major) marriage was stimulated by high sex ratios and was more likely in towns. Major marriage tended to be delayed when the head of the household had an occupation classified as "elite", "business" or "industrial" (compared with farmers). Finally,
Hakka girls, at least those living with their parents, married later than non-Hakka girls.
Perhaps the Hakka did keep their daughters somewhat longer at home, because of their usefulness for outdoor work.
[ Table 4 about here]
Discussion
Using a "competing risks" event history analysis has enabled us to gain more insight in how the situation of sons and daughters in Taiwanese families affected both the timing of their marriage as the decision of how they were to be married. Apart from the family situation our models allowed to include in the analysis the economic conjuncture as well as characteristics of the communities involved, such as the sex ratio. Thus, we were able to test, and in fact corroborate, many hypotheses that have been proposed in earlier ethnographic studies.
However, our calculations have also led to results that need to be investigated in more detail.
For example, a relative shortage of male workers in the household did not increase the likelihood of an uxorilocal wedding whereas simply a small family size did.
Marriage in early-twentieth century Taiwan had two sides. The one was its entrenchment in patriarchy and ancestor worship. Sons were needed to worship the ancestral tablets and having sons was the prime purpose of marriage. But one married not only out of a filial sense of duty. To be married was also an inalienable personal right to be enjoyed as soon as possible. The other side of Taiwanese marriage was its flexibility within the parameters just sketched. The timing of marriage could be adjusted to accommodate for price fluctuations.
Moreover, the type of marriage -that included the residential choice of the couple -could be adapted to the families' current situation. Thus, men from poor families with too many (older) brothers and no parents to support them could and did marry in the ignoble "uxorilocal" way.
That is, they came to live in the households of girls who had no or only younger brothers and whose parents were actively engaged in making a deal with the prospective husband and his family. Many families anticipated the difficulty of finding a suitable spouse for their son by adopting and raising a daughter-in-law themselves. However, they were equally flexible in adopting her out again, or finding another solution, when the marriage was not to be.
Apart from economic fluctuations and household composition, our outcomes point at many other factors that influence the timing and type of marriage. These factors are behind the strong regional and temporal variation in marriage that was found when anthropological studies of various Taiwanese field sites were compared. Our analysis of individual households suggests that Hakka men and women who did not marry in the minor fashion, married later than other people. This was not found in earlier studies, possibly because they were based on more aggregated material. The delay of marriage may be related to the outdoor work of
Hakka women, whose feet were not bound. There are also differences between the North and South of Taiwan. In the North (and North West), marriages were even earlier and more universal than in the South. However, because we have only two field sites to represent the South we need to be cautious in this respect. People in towns had a higher propensity for major marriage than people living in rural areas.
Depending on the gender of their child, the social status of the parents had a different bearing on the marital choice. The higher the occupation of the father, the earlier the marriage of the sons. Sons of labourers tended to marry relatively later and left home more often to join another household, at least temporarily. For daughters, on the other hand, high social status was associated with marriage delay, at least to some extent.
In the period under consideration, Taiwan was undergoing rapid change. The strong male surplus of the period around 1900 was disappearing, which eased the pressure on the adoption and marriage markets. People in the younger cohorts were less inclined to adopt a sim-pua and less eager to marry one who was already present. In addition, people began to benefit from the rapid commercialization of the country, although the economy was strongly subjected to Japanese colonial rule. Increased wealth may have led to a renewed interest in major marriage and a decline in the need for uxorilocal marriage. Possibly, instead of reverting to uxorilocal marriage, people chose to delay the wedding date in response to economic bad times. "Modern" notions of romantic love corroded paternal hold on partner choice, at least in the most disliked form of minor marriage. For the variables Number of household members and Population turnover, the hazard ratio is expressed at a 10% increase. Events were groups in months. We use the EXACT method to handle ties that arise from grouping continuous, united data. The following variables were measured at age 15 of the individuals: Occupation of household head, parent presence, family type, proportion of males aged 15-65 in household, number of household members, and sibling positions. Sex ratio, food price, population size, population turnover rate are time dependent covariates, with one year lag effect. Sex ratio is the sex ratio of unmarried men and women aged between 15 and 24, using study area data. Food price is the island-wide food price in Samuel P.S. Ho's Economic Development of Taiwan, 1860-1970 (1978 , Appendix Tables A74,A76 ), in part based on Toshiyuki Mizoguchi's "Consumer Prices and Real Wages in Taiwan and Korea Under Japan Rule," 
